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VuXML IDDescription
c1b2b492-6999-11ec-a50c-001cc0382b2fMbed TLS -- Potential double-free after an out of memory error

Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard reports:

If mbedtls_ssl_set_session() or mbedtls_ssl_get_session() were to fail with MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED (in an out of memory condition), then calling mbedtls_ssl_session_free() and mbedtls_ssl_free() in the usual manner would cause an internal session buffer to be freed twice, due to two structures both having valid pointers to it after a call to ssl_session_copy().

An attacker could potentially trigger the out of memory condition, and therefore use this bug to create memory corruption, which could then be further exploited or targetted.


Discovery 2021-12-14
Entry 2021-12-30
mbedtls
< 2.16.12

ge 2.17.0 lt 2.28.0

CVE-2021-44732
https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2021-12
293f40a0-ffa1-11e8-b258-0011d823eebdMbed TLS -- Local timing attack on RSA decryption

Janos Follath reports:

An attacker who can run code on the same machine that is performing an RSA decryption can potentially recover the plaintext through a Bleichenbacher-like oracle.


Discovery 2018-11-28
Entry 2018-12-14
mbedtls
< 2.14.1

https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2018-03
CVE-2018-19608
bcdeb6d2-f02d-11ea-838a-0011d823eebdMbed TLS -- Local side channel attack on RSA and static Diffie-Hellman

Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard reports:

An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave such as SGX or the TrustZone secure world) can recover the private keys used in RSA or static (finite-field) Diffie-Hellman operations.


Discovery 2020-09-01
Entry 2020-09-06
mbedtls
< 2.16.8

https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-09-2
056ea107-5729-11ea-a2f3-001cc0382b2fMbed TLS -- Cache attack against RSA key import in SGX

Janos Follath reports:

If Mbed TLS is running in an SGX enclave and the adversary has control of the main operating system, they can launch a side channel attack to recover the RSA private key when it is being imported.

The attack only requires access to fine grained measurements to cache usage. Therefore the attack might be applicable to a scenario where Mbed TLS is running in TrustZone secure world and the attacker controls the normal world or possibly when Mbed TLS is part of a hypervisor and the adversary has full control of a guest OS.


Discovery 2020-02-18
Entry 2020-02-24
mbedtls
< 2.16.5

https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-02
bf1f47c4-7f1b-11ea-bf94-001cc0382b2fMbed TLS -- Side channel attack on ECDSA

Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard reports:

An attacker with access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave such as SGX or the TrustZone secure world) can fully recover an ECDSA private key after observing a number of signature operations.


Discovery 2020-04-14
Entry 2020-04-15
mbedtls
< 2.16.6

https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-04
CVE-2020-10932
c685edd9-c045-11ea-8898-001cc0382b2fMbed TLS -- Side-channel attack on ECC key import and validation

Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard reports:

The scalar multiplication function in Mbed TLS accepts a random number generator (RNG) as an optional argument and, if provided, uses it to protect against some attacks.

It is the caller's responsibility to provide a RNG if protection against side-channel attacks is desired; however two groups of functions in Mbed TLS itself fail to pass a RNG:

  1. mbedtls_pk_parse_key() and mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile()
  2. mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and mbedtls_pk_check_pair()

When those functions are called, scalar multiplication is computed without randomisation, a number of old and new attacks apply, allowing a powerful local attacker to fully recover the private key.


Discovery 2020-07-01
Entry 2020-07-07
mbedtls
< 2.16.7

https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07
4c69240f-f02c-11ea-838a-0011d823eebdMbed TLS -- Local side channel attack on classical CBC decryption in (D)TLS

Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard reports:

When decrypting/authenticating (D)TLS record in a connection using a CBC ciphersuite without the Encrypt-then-Mac extension RFC 7366, Mbed TLS used dummy rounds of the compression function associated with the hash used for HMAC in order to hide the length of the padding to remote attackers, as recommended in the original Lucky Thirteen paper.

A local attacker who is able to observe the state of the cache could monitor the presence of mbedtls_md_process() in the cache in order to determine when the actual computation ends and when the dummy rounds start. This is a reliable target as it's always called at least once, in response to a previous attack. The attacker can then continue with one of many well-documented Lucky 13 variants.


Discovery 2020-09-01
Entry 2020-09-06
mbedtls
< 2.16.8

https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-09-1
CVE-2020-16150
1c948fd3-dac0-11e9-81b2-0011d823eebdMbed TLS -- Side channel attack on deterministic ECDSA

Janos Follath reports:

Mbed TLS does not have a constant-time/constant-trace arithmetic library and uses blinding to protect against side channel attacks.

In the ECDSA signature routine previous Mbed TLS versions used the same RNG object for generating the ephemeral key pair and for generating the blinding values. The deterministic ECDSA function reused this by passing the RNG object created from the private key and the message to be signed as prescribed by RFC 6979. This meant that the same RNG object was used whenever the same message was signed, rendering the blinding ineffective.

If the victim can be tricked to sign the same message repeatedly, the private key may be recoverable through side channels.


Discovery 2019-09-06
Entry 2019-09-19
mbedtls
< 2.16.3

https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2019-10
b70b880f-5727-11ea-a2f3-001cc0382b2fMbed TLS -- Side channel attack on ECDSA

Janos Follath reports:

Our bignum implementation is not constant time/constant trace, so side channel attacks can retrieve the blinded value, factor it (as it is smaller than RSA keys and not guaranteed to have only large prime factors), and then, by brute force, recover the key.


Discovery 2019-10-25
Entry 2020-02-24
mbedtls
< 2.16.4

https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2019-12
CVE-2019-18222