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VuXML IDDescription
4db1669c-8589-11db-ac4f-02e081235dabgnupg -- remotely controllable function pointer

Werner Koch reports:

GnuPG uses data structures called filters to process OpenPGP messages. These filters are used in a similar way as a pipelines in the shell. For communication between these filters context structures are used. These are usually allocated on the stack and passed to the filter functions. At most places the OpenPGP data stream fed into these filters is closed before the context structure gets deallocated. While decrypting encrypted packets, this may not happen in all cases and the filter may use a void contest structure filled with garbage. An attacker may control this garbage. The filter context includes another context used by the low-level decryption to access the decryption algorithm. This is done using a function pointer. By carefully crafting an OpenPGP message, an attacker may control this function pointer and call an arbitrary function of the process. Obviously an exploit needs to prepared for a specific version, compiler, libc, etc to be successful - but it is definitely doable.

Fixing this is obvious: We need to allocate the context on the heap and use a reference count to keep it valid as long as either the controlling code or the filter code needs it.

We have checked all other usages of such a stack based filter contexts but fortunately found no other vulnerable places. This allows to release a relatively small patch. However, for reasons of code cleanness and easier audits we will soon start to change all these stack based filter contexts to heap based ones.


Discovery 2006-12-04
Entry 2006-12-07
Modified 2006-12-15
gnupg
< 1.4.6

CVE-2006-6235
http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2006q4/000246.html
http://secunia.com/advisories/23245/
23f65f58-a261-11e9-b444-002590acae31GnuPG -- denial of service

From the GnuPG 2.2.17 changelog:

gpg: Ignore all key-signatures received from keyservers. This change is required to mitigate a DoS due to keys flooded with faked key-signatures.


Discovery 2019-07-03
Entry 2019-07-09
gnupg
< 2.2.17

https://dev.gnupg.org/T4606
https://dev.gnupg.org/T4607
2e5715f8-67f7-11e3-9811-b499baab0cbegnupg -- RSA Key Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Acoustic Cryptanalysis attack

Werner Koch reports:

CVE-2013-4576 has been assigned to this security bug.

The paper describes two attacks. The first attack allows to distinguish keys: An attacker is able to notice which key is currently used for decryption. This is in general not a problem but may be used to reveal the information that a message, encrypted to a commonly not used key, has been received by the targeted machine. We do not have a software solution to mitigate this attack.

The second attack is more serious. It is an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack to reveal the private key. A possible scenario is that the attacker places a sensor (for example a standard smartphone) in the vicinity of the targeted machine. That machine is assumed to do unattended RSA decryption of received mails, for example by using a mail client which speeds up browsing by opportunistically decrypting mails expected to be read soon. While listening to the acoustic emanations of the targeted machine, the smartphone will send new encrypted messages to that machine and re-construct the private key bit by bit. A 4096 bit RSA key used on a laptop can be revealed within an hour.


Discovery 2013-12-18
Entry 2013-12-18
Modified 2014-04-30
gnupg
< 1.4.16

gnupg1
< 1.4.16

CVE-2013-4576
http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2013q4/000337.html
f900bda8-0472-11db-bbf7-000c6ec775d9gnupg -- user id integer overflow vulnerability

If GnuPG processes a userid with a very long packet length, GnuPG can crash due to insufficient bounds check. This can result in a denial-of-service condition or potentially execution of arbitrary code with the privileges of the user running GnuPG.


Discovery 2006-05-31
Entry 2006-06-25
gnupg
< 1.4.4

18554
CVE-2006-3082
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=gnupg-users&m=115124706210430
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=full-disclosure&m=114907659313360
http://cvs.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/viewcvs.cgi/trunk/g10/parse-packet.c?rev=4157&r1=4141&r2=4157
7da0417f-6b24-11e8-84cc-002590acae31gnupg -- unsanitized output (CVE-2018-12020)

GnuPG reports:

GnuPG did not sanitize input file names, which may then be output to the terminal. This could allow terminal control sequences or fake status messages to be injected into the output.


Discovery 2018-06-07
Entry 2018-06-08
gnupg
< 2.2.8

gnupg1
< 1.4.23

https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-12020
CVE-2018-12020
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-7526
CVE-2017-7526
948921ad-afbc-11da-bad9-02e081235dabGnuPG does not detect injection of unsigned data

Werner Koch reports:

In the aftermath of the false positive signature verfication bug (announced 2006-02-15) more thorough testing of the fix has been done and another vulnerability has been detected. This new problem affects the use of *gpg* for verification of signatures which are _not_ detached signatures. The problem also affects verification of signatures embedded in encrypted messages; i.e. standard use of gpg for mails.


Discovery 2006-03-09
Entry 2006-03-10
Modified 2006-03-11
gnupg
< 1.4.2.2

CVE-2006-0049
http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2006q1/000216.html
1c840eb9-fb32-11e3-866e-b499baab0cbegnupg -- possible DoS using garbled compressed data packets

Werner Koch reports:

This release includes a *security fix* to stop a possible DoS using garbled compressed data packets which can be used to put gpg into an infinite loop.


Discovery 2014-06-23
Entry 2014-06-23
gnupg1
< 1.4.17

gnupg
< 2.0.24

http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2014q2/000344.html
http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2014q2/000345.html
63fe4189-9f97-11da-ac32-0001020eed82gnupg -- false positive signature verification

Werner Koch reports:

The Gentoo project identified a security related bug in GnuPG. When using any current version of GnuPG for unattended signature verification (e.g. by scripts and mail programs), false positive signature verification of detached signatures may occur.

This problem affects the tool *gpgv*, as well as using "gpg --verify" to imitate gpgv, if only the exit code of the process is used to decide whether a detached signature is valid. This is a plausible mode of operation for gpgv.

If, as suggested, the --status-fd generated output is used to decide whether a signature is valid, no problem exists. In particular applications making use of the GPGME library[2] are not affected.


Discovery 2006-02-15
Entry 2006-02-17
gnupg
< 1.4.2.1

CVE-2006-0455
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=gnupg-devel&m=113999098729114
81313647-2d03-11d8-9355-0020ed76ef5aElGamal sign+encrypt keys created by GnuPG can be compromised

Any ElGamal sign+encrypt keys created by GnuPG contain a cryptographic weakness that may allow someone to obtain the private key. These keys should be considered unusable and should be revoked.

The following summary was written by Werner Koch, GnuPG author:

Phong Nguyen identified a severe bug in the way GnuPG creates and uses ElGamal keys for signing. This is a significant security failure which can lead to a compromise of almost all ElGamal keys used for signing. Note that this is a real world vulnerability which will reveal your private key within a few seconds.

...

Please take immediate action and revoke your ElGamal signing keys. Furthermore you should take whatever measures necessary to limit the damage done for signed or encrypted documents using that key.

Note that the standard keys as generated by GnuPG (DSA and ElGamal encryption) as well as RSA keys are NOT vulnerable. Note also that ElGamal signing keys cannot be generated without the use of a special flag to enable hidden options and even then overriding a warning message about this key type. See below for details on how to identify vulnerable keys.


Discovery 2003-11-27
Entry 2003-12-12
gnupg
ge 1.0.2 lt 1.2.3_4

CVE-2003-0971
http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2003-November/020570.html
749b5587-2da1-11e3-b1a9-b499baab0cbegnupg -- possible infinite recursion in the compressed packet parser

Werner Koch reports:

Special crafted input data may be used to cause a denial of service against GPG (GnuPG's OpenPGP part) and some other OpenPGP implementations. All systems using GPG to process incoming data are affected..


Discovery 2013-10-05
Entry 2013-10-05
gnupg
< 1.4.15

ge 2.0.0 lt 2.0.22

CVE-2013-4402
8375a73f-01bf-11da-bc08-0001020eed82gnupg -- OpenPGP symmetric encryption vulnerability

Serge Mister and Robert Zuccherato reports that the OpenPGP protocol is vulnerable to a cryptographic attack when using symmetric encryption in an automated way.

David Shaw reports about the impact:

This attack, while very significant from a cryptographic point of view, is not generally effective in the real world. To be specific, unless you have your OpenPGP program set up as part of an automated system to accept encrypted messages, decrypt them, and then provide a response to the submitter, then this does not affect you at all.

Note that the fix in GnuPG does note completely eliminate the potential problem:

These patches disable a portion of the OpenPGP protocol that the attack is exploiting. This change should not be user visible. With the patch in place, this attack will not work using a public-key encrypted message. It will still work using a passphrase-encrypted message.


Discovery 2005-02-08
Entry 2005-07-31
Modified 2007-04-23
gnupg
< 1.4.1

p5-Crypt-OpenPGP
le 1.03

pgp
ge 3.0

303094
CVE-2005-0366
http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/033
http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2005q1/000191.html
http://www.pgp.com/newsroom/ctocorner/openpgp.html
30394651-13e1-11dd-bab7-0016179b2dd5gnupg -- memory corruption vulnerability

Secunia reports:

A vulnerability has been reported in GnuPG, which can potentially be exploited to compromise a vulnerable system.

The vulnerability is caused due to an error when importing keys with duplicated IDs. This can be exploited to cause a memory corruption when importing keys via --refresh-keys or --import.

Successful exploitation potentially allows execution of arbitrary code, but has not been proven yet.


Discovery 2008-03-19
Entry 2008-04-26
Modified 2008-04-29
gnupg
ge 1.0.0 lt 1.4.9

ge 2.0.0 lt 2.0.9

28487
CVE-2008-1530
http://www.ocert.org/advisories/ocert-2008-1.html
http://secunia.com/advisories/29568
https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/issue894
ed529baa-21c6-11db-b625-02e081235dabgnupg -- 2 more possible memory allocation attacks

Author reports:

Fixed 2 more possible memory allocation attacks. They are similar to the problem we fixed with 1.4.4. This bug can easily be exploted for a DoS; remote code execution is not entirely impossible.


Discovery 2006-08-01
Entry 2006-08-02
gnupg
< 1.4.5

http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2006q3/000229.html
80771b89-f57b-11e2-bf21-b499baab0cbegnupg -- side channel attack on RSA secret keys

A Yarom and Falkner paper reports:

Flush+Reload is a cache side-channel attack that monitors access to data in shared pages. In this paper we demonstrate how to use the attack to extract private encryption keys from GnuPG. The high resolution and low noise of the Flush+Reload attack enables a spy program to recover over 98% of the bits of the private key in a single decryption or signing round. Unlike previous attacks, the attack targets the last level L3 cache. Consequently, the spy program and the victim do not need to share the execution core of the CPU. The attack is not limited to a traditional OS and can be used in a virtualised environment, where it can attack programs executing in a different VM.


Discovery 2013-07-18
Entry 2013-07-25
Modified 2013-07-26
gnupg
< 1.4.14

http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/448
http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2013q3/000330.html
34c93ae8-7e6f-11db-bf00-02e081235dabgnupg -- buffer overflow

Werner Koch reports:

When running GnuPG interactively, special crafted messages may be used to crash gpg or gpg2. Running gpg in batch mode, as done by all software using gpg as a backend (e.g. mailers), is not affected by this bug.

Exploiting this overflow seems to be possible.

gpg-agent, gpgsm, gpgv or other tools from the GnuPG suite are not affected.


Discovery 2006-11-27
Entry 2006-11-27
gnupg
< 1.4.5_1

http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2006q4/000241.html