FreshPorts - VuXML

From the GnuPG 2.2.17 changelog:

gpg: Ignore all key-signatures received from keyservers. This change is required to mitigate a DoS due to keys flooded with faked key-signatures.

< 2.2.17

GnuPG reports:

GnuPG did not sanitize input file names, which may then be output to the terminal. This could allow terminal control sequences or fake status messages to be injected into the output.

< 2.2.8

< 1.4.23

Secunia reports:

A vulnerability has been reported in GnuPG, which can potentially be exploited to compromise a vulnerable system.

The vulnerability is caused due to an error when importing keys with duplicated IDs. This can be exploited to cause a memory corruption when importing keys via --refresh-keys or --import.

Successful exploitation potentially allows execution of arbitrary code, but has not been proven yet.

ge 1.0.0 lt 1.4.9

ge 2.0.0 lt 2.0.9

Werner Koch reports:

This release includes a *security fix* to stop a possible DoS using garbled compressed data packets which can be used to put gpg into an infinite loop.

< 1.4.17

< 2.0.24

Werner Koch reports:

CVE-2013-4576 has been assigned to this security bug.

The paper describes two attacks. The first attack allows to distinguish keys: An attacker is able to notice which key is currently used for decryption. This is in general not a problem but may be used to reveal the information that a message, encrypted to a commonly not used key, has been received by the targeted machine. We do not have a software solution to mitigate this attack.

The second attack is more serious. It is an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack to reveal the private key. A possible scenario is that the attacker places a sensor (for example a standard smartphone) in the vicinity of the targeted machine. That machine is assumed to do unattended RSA decryption of received mails, for example by using a mail client which speeds up browsing by opportunistically decrypting mails expected to be read soon. While listening to the acoustic emanations of the targeted machine, the smartphone will send new encrypted messages to that machine and re-construct the private key bit by bit. A 4096 bit RSA key used on a laptop can be revealed within an hour.

< 1.4.16

< 1.4.16

A Yarom and Falkner paper reports:

Flush+Reload is a cache side-channel attack that monitors access to data in shared pages. In this paper we demonstrate how to use the attack to extract private encryption keys from GnuPG. The high resolution and low noise of the Flush+Reload attack enables a spy program to recover over 98% of the bits of the private key in a single decryption or signing round. Unlike previous attacks, the attack targets the last level L3 cache. Consequently, the spy program and the victim do not need to share the execution core of the CPU. The attack is not limited to a traditional OS and can be used in a virtualised environment, where it can attack programs executing in a different VM.

< 1.4.14

Werner Koch reports:

Special crafted input data may be used to cause a denial of service against GPG (GnuPG's OpenPGP part) and some other OpenPGP implementations. All systems using GPG to process incoming data are affected..

< 1.4.15

ge 2.0.0 lt 2.0.22